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The Collective Action Framing of Conservative Christian Groups 
in Britain  
 
Steven Kettell 
Department of Politics and International Studies 




Conservative Christian groups in Britain have been involved in a number of high profile and 
controversial policy issues. Scholarly research into the political activities of such groups, 
however, remains limited. This article addresses this lacuna by exploring the collective action 
frames deployed by conservative Christian groups in their attempts to influence national level 
policies and debates. Drawing on elite interviews with group representatives, it argues that 
these frames have been constructed largely in response to the pressures of secularisation, but 
have, in many respects, become secularised themselves.  
 
Keywords 




In recent years conservative Christian groups in Britain have been involved in a number of 
high profile and controversial issues. Notable flashpoints have included disputes around free 
speech, abortion, assisted dying, same-sex marriage, the regulation of medical technologies, 
religious freedom and equalities legislation. Notwithstanding a number of studies into the 
historical, sociological and anthropological qualities of conservative forms of Christianity in 
Britain (e.g. Bebbington, 1989; Wolffe, 1995; Thompson, 2009; Bebbington and Jones, 2013; 
Strhan, 2015, 2016), scholarly research into the political activities of conservative Christian 
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groups has been relatively limited. In addition, the small number of analyses have tended to 
focus on a select number of issues, typically centring on the debate around an emergent 
British ‘Christian Right’ comparable to the movement that developed in the United States 
from the 1970s (e.g. Walton et al, 2013), and the approach taken by conservative Christian 
groups to ‘moral issues’ such as homosexuality and abortion (e.g. see Durham, 2005; Burack 
and Wilson, 2009; Hunt, 2010, 2014). 
In one respect this lack of scholarly attention is understandable. Conservative Christian 
groups attempting to shape developments at a national level are relatively few in number and 
are usually considered to exert little cultural or political influence (Walton et al, 2013). Yet 
the engagement of such groups with high-profile affairs demonstrates a significant 
commitment to activism, and their potential influence cannot be wholly discounted – not least 
given the substantial size of the conservative (or conservative-leaning) Christian population. 
For these reasons the political activities of conservative Christian groups remains a 
worthwhile topic for analysis. 
This article contributes to scholarship in this area by exploring the collective action frames 
that are deployed by Britain’s main conservative Christian organisations. Collective action 
frames are an essential part of the way in which groups and movements seek to effect 
political, social and/or cultural change, providing a narrative designed to simplify and 
condense the core elements of the world in which they are operating, as well as encapsulate 
their shared beliefs and values in an easily understandable way. In this respect a collective 
action frame has multiple, interrelated objectives: to identify key problems and adversaries, to 
highlight grievances and injustices, to consolidate and reaffirm group cohesion and solidarity, 
to propose an agenda for change, and to legitimise objectives and mobilise actors to pursue 
them. In short, a collective action frame seeks to advance the interests of the group while 
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simultaneously undermining the claims and efforts of their opponents (see Benford and 
Snow, 2000; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Rohlinger and Quadagno, 2009; Graham, 2013).   
In order to be successful, a collective action frame must appeal to two distinct ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ sets of audiences (generally breaking down into group and non-group members). 
Messages primarily directed towards members of the group (such as statements made in 
newsletters or promotional appeals) must be pitched to strengthen or sustain cohesion and 
mobilisation, while messages principally targeted at those outside the group (such as general 
media interviews, the use of social media or public statements about values, goals and policy) 
need to be tailored to persuade and possibly recruit others to the cause. While the division 
between these two orientations is not always clear-cut (media statements can also be used to 
signal a position to an internal audience, for instance), the bifurcation raises important 
strategic considerations (on these points see Gamson, 1997).  
The process by which a collective action frame is constructed and deployed is shaped by a 
number of factors. These include: the ability of the group to mobilise resources (such as 
money, manpower and positive media coverage), its relationships to political opportunity 
structures (including state institutions, political parties and relevant policy networks), as well 
as the impact of wider sociocultural variables (such as perceptions of legitimacy, cultural 
norms and general public attitudes). The role of internal tensions and debates around goals 
and strategies are important here as well. Collective action frames are the outcome of 
negotiated processes in which disputes over goals and strategy may emerge. The possibility 
for intra-group conflict is all the more pressing in a context in which the aims and values of a 
group diverge from those of the wider society they wish to influence, with potential strains 
between a desire for ideological purity and pragmatism making a successful frame all the 
more difficult to achieve (Benford and Snow, 2000; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Lichterman, 
1999, 2008).  
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This dilemma has been all the more pronounced in the case of conservative Christian groups 
by the growing pressures of secularisation. With religion in Britain declining across all key 
measures of religiosity, conservative groups have increasingly turned to the use of collective 
action frames based on overtly secular norms and values rather than theological assertions. 
While this may be a strategic imperative for engaging with a largely secular society, the 
implications are potentially significant, raising the prospect of schisms as well as a loss of 
control over the direction of narrative structures themselves. 
The empirical research for this study is primarily drawn from a series of eight semi-structured 
interviews with elite level representatives from conservative Christian groups seeking to 
effect change at the national level. Although there is no authoritative view on which 
conservative Christian groups might be the most important in terms of influencing national 
politics in Britain, a number of organisations attract consistent attention within the scholarly 
literature and commentary on the subject. These groups typically include: the Christian 
Institute, the Evangelical Alliance, Anglican Mainstream, Christian Concern, Christian 
Voice, Christian Action Research and Education (CARE), the Conservative Christian 
Fellowship, the Jubilee Centre, the Christian Medical Fellowship, Core Issues Trust and the 
Christian Legal Centre. 
These groups were all approached to take part in the study, and the subsequent interviews 
were conducted under conditions of anonymity. Five of the interviewees were directly 
responsible for leading their organisation, and all were involved at a senior operational and 
decision-making level.1 These interviews were supplemented by a qualitative analysis of 
media reports and public statements from conservative Christian groups, and by a series of 
interviews with representatives from more mainstream religious organisations. Although the 
number of interviewees involved in the main sample is relatively small, and while due care 
must therefore be taken when attempting to generalise from their responses – the composition 
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of the main sample was also predominantly male and white as well as being largely London-
centric – the primary interviews cover the majority of key national level conservative 
Christian groups in Britain, and provide a valuable insight into critical aspects of their 
worldview.  
 
Conservative Christianity in Britain 
The most influential conservative Christian groups in Britain derive predominantly from the 
evangelical wing of the Christian faith and are primarily Anglican leaning.2 The precise 
denominational breakdown, however, is difficult to determine. Many organisations do not 
explicitly declare a denominational orientation, while others, such as the Christian Institute, 
describe themselves as non-denominational (http://www.christian.org.uk/whoweare/faq/).  
The driving forces and motivations behind the establishment of these groups are diverse. The 
Evangelical Alliance was formed in 1846, and the Christian Medical Fellowship (which aims 
to help and support Christians in the medical profession) was set up in 1949. CARE was 
established in 1971 (as the direct successor to the Festival of Light), the Jubilee Centre was 
founded in 1983 and the Christian Institute began in the late 1980s (being formally 
established in 1991) as a reaction to concerns about ‘the moral direction of the nation and the 
implications for society’ (Christian Institute, 2011). The Conservative Christian Fellowship 
was established in 1990 to provide a link between the Conservative Party and the wider 
Christian community. More recently, Anglican Mainstream was set up in 2005, and Core 
Issues Trust in 2007, both emerging in response to changing social views and issues around 
sexuality. Christian Concern was formed in 2008 to act as a sister organisation to the 
Christian Legal Centre, which was established to defend and support the legal rights of 
Christians the previous year. 
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Firm data on the size of these groups remains elusive. Some organisations (such as Christian 
Concern and Anglican Mainstream) do not have formal membership structures, while others 
(such as Christian Voice) do not make their membership details publicly available. The 
variable quality of the information on offer makes direct comparisons difficult. The Christian 
Medical Fellowship counts over 4,000 doctors and 800 medical students among its 
membership (https://www.cmf.org.uk/about/); the Evangelical Alliance (Britain’s largest 
evangelical organisation) purports to represent evangelicals from no fewer than seventy-nine 
denominations, with more than 23,000 members (http://www.eauk.org/connect/about-us/); 
and Christian Concern points to a mailing list of over 43,000 individuals and churches 
(http://www.christianconcern.com/about).  
In financial terms, however, these organisations are comparatively small. According to 
annual accounts submitted to the Charity Commission, the Christian Institute had a yearly 
income of £2.6 million for the year ending December 2014, the Evangelical Alliance had an 
income of £2.3 million (up to March 2015), CARE had an income of just under £2 million 
(March 2015), and the Christian Medical Fellowship had an income stream of £1.3 million 
(December 2014). Virtually all these earnings came from voluntary donations and the figures 
pale in comparison to Britain’s larger charitable organisations. The National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, for example, has an annual income in excess of £134 
million, while the largest (overtly) religious charity, Christian Aid, had an income of £100 
million.   
Measuring the wider social support for conservative Christian groups is also problematic. 
One issue here concerns the inadequacies of available survey data. The last (2011) national 
census question on religious identification in England and Wales simply directed Christian 
respondents to categorise themselves as: ‘Christian (including Church of England, Catholic, 
Protestant and all other Christian denominations)’ (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
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method/measuring-equality/equality/ethnic-nat-identity-religion/religion/index.html). 
Nevertheless, recent figures show that Conservative Christian denominations are among the 
fastest growing. Pentecostalism, for example, enjoyed a 21% increase in membership 
between 2008 and 2013, and is expected to see a 25% increase from 2013 to 2020 (Brierley, 
2014).  
Another problem concerns the limited data on the views and opinions of conservative 
Christians themselves. The available evidence indicates that they do not subscribe to any 
homogenous political position. A survey of more than 2,000 evangelicals conducted by the 
Evangelical Alliance in 2015 found that 92% of respondents believed that Christians should 
be more engaged in politics, but voting intentions were split between Labour (31%), the 
Conservatives (28%), UKIP (12%) and the Liberal Democrats (11%).3 At the same time, 
voting intentions were dominated by a set of shared moral concerns. The highest-ranking 
issue in this case was religious liberty and freedom, with 71% of respondents claiming that 
this would shape their decision on how to vote. Other key issues included policies on poverty 
(cited by 61%), human trafficking (59%), opposition to same-sex marriage (46%) and pro-life 
issues around euthanasia (45%) and abortion (41%). More than half (57%) of respondents felt 
that the UK was ‘a Christian country and this should be reflected in its laws’ (Evangelical 
Alliance, 2015).  
This emphasis on moral themes is strongly shaped by theological influences. The largest 
survey of evangelical opinion in Britain (also conducted by the Evangelical Alliance), 
involving a poll of over 17,000 people – more than 15,000 of whom self-identified as 
evangelical – found that 96% of respondents claimed to attend church at least once a week, 
91% strongly believed that Jesus was the only way to god and 88% strongly agreed that their 
faith was the most important thing in their lives. Traditional and conservative views were also 
significant, with almost two-fifths (37%) of respondents professing a belief in hell and around 
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a fifth maintaining that Christianity and evolution were incompatible (Evangelical Alliance, 
2011).  
 
Aims and activities 
The political activities of conservative Christian groups are primarily directed towards two 
kinds of audiences. The former of these (what might be termed ‘inward-facing’) activities are 
tailored towards members of the group and like-minded constituencies, and are designed to 
address issues and concerns that are specific to the group itself, or to its own sectional area of 
expertise (for example, providing legal support or advice in the case of the Christian Legal 
Centre). In this respect, a key aim of conservative Christian groups is to reify group 
boundaries and to reinforce a sense of identity, meaning and belonging for their members or 
like-minded individuals. According to one interviewee, a central goal of their organisation is 
to show ‘ordinary Christian people’ that someone is out there making their case, and to 
reassure them that they are not ‘swivel-eyed loons’ (interview #6, 22 May 2013). Another 
notes that the direction of their organisation is ‘not so much campaigns, it’s more drawing 
things to people’s attention’, and that its efforts are ‘not so much aimed at the general public, 
but just to raise up a standard so that people who are listening who agree with me say “oh 
yeah, hang on a minute, somebody there’s saying what I believe”’. The general aim, in this 
regard, is ‘to provide a testimony … a little flag that people can rally around’ (interview #7, 4 
June 2013). 
Running parallel to this, the external (or ‘outward-facing’) activities of conservative Christian 
groups are aimed at securing two overarching objectives: shaping opinions within British 
society and culture with a view to promoting a greater role for Christianity, and influencing 
matters of public policy. These goals are reflected in the public mission statements of 
conservative Christian groups. The stated position of Christian Concern, for example, is ‘to 
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work to infuse a biblical worldview into every aspect of society ... to be a strong Christian 
voice in the public sphere’, and to ‘change public opinion on issues of key importance and 
affect policy at the highest levels’ (http://www.christianconcern.com/about). The declared 
aim of the Christian Institute is to secure ‘the furtherance and promotion of the Christian 
religion in the United Kingdom’, calling on the British state ‘to adopt Christian values and to 
implement godly laws’ (Christian Institute, 2008). These sentiments are echoed by Christian 
Voice, an organisation that describes itself as promoting ‘Christianity with testosterone’, and 
as ‘looking to take the battle to the Lord’s enemies’ 
(http://www.christianvoice.org.uk/index.php/about-us/). Taking a less combative stance, the 
Conservative Christian Fellowship claims to effect change by providing ‘a strong, relational 
bridge’ between the Conservative Party and the wider Christian community 
(https://www.christian-conservatives.org.uk/we-are-ccf-0).  
Group representatives are keen to stress that these objectives are not about imposing 
theological dictates on the rest of society but are about securing a fair hearing for members of 
the Christian faith. As one respondent puts it, the general aim is not ‘to create some kind of 
theocracy that overrules the rights and views of people who differ fundamentally from 
ourselves’, but simply to find a way ‘that allows society to enable different points of view to 
function’ (interview #8, 6 June 2013). Making a similar point, another explains that a key 
ambition is to see a society ‘in which the central position of the church in the country is still 
maintained, and there’s a recognition and understanding that Biblical principles, the 
outworking of individuals and the church’s position on Christian faith is recognised as being 
one for the public good’ (interview #2, 18 April 2013). One representative maintains that 
politics is ‘a dirty old business but it’s an important business, it’s about running the country, 
why wouldn’t you want men and women of faith and values being involved in it to bring their 
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principles and their integrity, their faith and so on, into that square?’ (interview #4, 23 April 
2013). 
Conservative Christian groups pursue their various objectives through a wide range of 
activities. These include the production of briefing papers, books, journals and newsletters, 
providing web-based resources and social media engagement, involvement in public talks, 
debates and media interviews, as well as lobbying activities such as meetings with MPs and 
related parties for campaigns and informational purposes. The Conservative Christian 
Fellowship, for instance, maintains direct and formal links to the Conservative Party (as well 
as cross-party groups, such as Christians in Parliament and Christians in Politics), and seeks 
to promote a Christian worldview by facilitating meetings between party officials and 
members of the wider Christian community on a range of policy issues. In a similar fashion, 
CARE supports its own lobbying activities by supplying interns directly to Members of 
Parliament. A former CARE official with close links to the scheme describes the aim as being 
to:  
 
train-up Christian leaders who were politically savvy, knew what was what, understood 
the political process … and would therefore influence public life in their own right 
when they were established in their political public life career … It was the goal of the 
programme to have political influence when these interns became MPs (interview #9, 
25 April 2013).   
 
Another interviewee notes that one of the core aims of their organisation is to shape the 
‘Mountains of Culture’ (such as Parliament, the Courts, the Church and the media), ‘and part 
of that is … trying to get laws which embody Judeo-Christian values on the statute books, 
trying to get Christian values shaping public life’ (interview #1, 16 April 2013). Likewise, 
one representative declares that ‘all facets of the public sphere, law, politics, media, even the 
academies’ are central to their mission, because ‘in terms of influence in the public sphere … 
they’re intertwined’ (interview #5, 25 April. 2013). Another maintains that the core goals of 
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their organisation are based around ‘influencing the social, cultural and spiritual discourse in 
a number of ways … so it’s a bit of lobbying, it’s a bit of advocacy, it’s a bit of 
representation’ (interview #3, 23 April. 2013). 
In advancing these aims conservative Christian groups do not function as a cohesive and co-
ordinated bloc or movement. On a general day-to-day level the main organisations do not 
engage with each other in a systematic co-operative way, and this lack of co-ordination 
(bordering in some cases on mutual antipathy) was also highlighted by interviewees.4 
Alliance building is not unknown, however, and the emergence of a policy issue on which 
there are strong views and common ground can lead to joint endeavours. The Coalition 
government’s decision to legalise same-sex marriage in 2013 is a classic example of this, 
producing concerted opposition from a range of religious groups. The main umbrella 
organisation opposing the move, Coalition for Marriage, counted Christian Concern and the 
Evangelical Alliance among its founder members, and had strong connections to a range of 
conservative Christian groups, including CARE, Anglican Mainstream and the Christian 
Institute.   
 
Problems and challenges  
While conservative Christian groups have diverse aims and structures, they face a number of 
common challenges linked to the growing pressures of secularisation and the long-term 
decline of religion in Britain. According to official figures from the Office for National 
Statistics (2011), the proportion of the adult population in England and Wales describing 
themselves as ‘Christian’ declined from 71.7% in 2001 to 59.3% in 2011, while the 
proportion of people identifying with ‘no religion’ rose from 14.8% to 25.1% over the same 
period. According to British Attitude Surveys (2014) the proportion of the adult population 
describing themselves as ‘Christian’ fell from 67% to 41.7% from 1983-2014, while the 
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proportion self-identifying as having ‘no religion’ rose from 31% to 48.9%. These findings 
are supported by a raft of additional studies and surveys suggesting that secularising trends 
continue to run through every indicator of religiosity, from decline at the level of beliefs, 
attendance and membership, to a loss of religious authority expressed in diminishing trust and 
confidence in both church and clergy (see e.g. Bruce, 2013; Field, 2014; Clements, 2015). 
A meta-analysis of opinion poll data (taken from 123 national and 35 local surveys) has 
revealed a similar picture of decline in the status of the Bible, suggesting a growing 
disjuncture between one the central pillars of the evangelical worldview and mainstream 
British society. While 82% of evangelical churchgoers professed to read or listen to the Bible 
at least once a week in 2010 (with 52% doing so daily), the overall proportion of British 
adults reading the Bible at least once a month fell from 24% in 1973 to just 8% in 2013. 
Literal interpretations of the Bible are also in decline. In 1973 56% of the British public 
proclaimed a belief in ‘Bible truth’, but in 2008 just 26% agreed that the Bible represented 
the divinely inspired word of God. Evangelical opinion, on the other hand, was far stronger. 
In 2010 almost three quarters (72%) of evangelical churchgoers claimed that the Bible was 
without error. In 2011 83% of evangelicals claimed that the Bible was the supreme authority 
guiding their beliefs, opinions and behaviours (see Field, 2014). 
These dynamics present conservative Christian groups with a two-pronged dilemma: 
imposing strategic pressures to position themselves within what is now an increasingly 
secularised external environment, but to fashion this appeal in such a way that it sustains a 
sense of internal cohesion and mobilisation amongst group members. The principal response 
to this – which has emerged in an un-planned and un-coordinated fashion – has been the 
deployment of a collective action frame built upon two primary assertions: first, that 
secularisation poses a serious threat to the social and moral probity of the nation, and second, 
that it represents a growing danger to religious freedoms. This approach, which draws on the 
 13 
salience of identity politics and a language of minority rights, contains strong similarities to 
(and, indeed, may well have been influenced by) the political strategy adopted by the 
Christian Right in the United States (on this see Jelen, 2005; Klemp, 2010; Thomas and 
Olson, 2012).5  
The first of these themes pulls together a number of interrelated points, maintaining that the 
decline of Christianity in Britain has led to a loss of social cohesion, the rise of a crude 
individualised culture and a sense of moral relativism, all of which are considered to be at the 
root of many of Britain’s social problems. Common assertions from group representatives 
here, for instance, include the claim that ‘there’s no longer a consensus about what’s right 
and wrong’ and that ‘we’re in a post-Christian multi-faith relativistic society where each 
person decides their own view’ (interview #1); that ‘the whole system is breaking down, at 
every level’ under the pressure of ‘this diversity stuff and being politically correct’ (interview 
#7); and that many of Britain’s problems are attributable to the fact that ‘[w]e don’t love 
Jesus enough … We don’t believe in a God that will judge, and in heaven and hell’ (interview 
#5). Another representative, in the same way, maintains that Britain’s social malaise is 
directly linked to a loss of Biblical principles. As they put it: ‘This is what happens when a 
society does not follow something straightforward like the 10 commandments, but says “no 
no no, we’re free to do what we want”’ (interview #6).  
The second core element of the collective action frame is that Christianity is now becoming 
increasingly marginalised in British society. The main perpetrators here are said to be vocal 
minority groups opposed to Christianity, most notably homosexual and Islamic organisations 
as well as militant secularists keen to drive religion from the public square. A central feature 
of this assertion is the notion that there now exists a competing hierarchy of rights in Britain, 
and that the rights of Christians have become subordinate to those of other social groups. 
Legal provisions on human rights (such as the European Convention on Human Rights and 
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the 1998 Human Rights Act) as well as legislative measures designed to promote greater 
equality and fairness (such as the 2004 Civil Partnership Act, the 2007 and 2010 Equality 
Acts and, more recently, the legalisation of same-sex marriage) have been instrumental in the 
adoption of this approach too (see Hunt, 2014). Claims that measures such as these pose a 
direct threat to religious freedom have also been accompanied by a series of high-profile legal 
challenges, most of which have centred on issues of alleged employment discrimination on 
religious grounds. Four of these cases (involving claims brought by Nadia Eweida, Shirley 
Chaplin, Lillian Ladele and Gary McFarlane) were heard, and three of them rejected, by the 
European Court of Human Rights in 2013.6  
Perceptions of marginalisation are highly prevalent among representatives of conservative 
Christian groups. Describing a situation of ‘residual, secular antipathy towards all religion 
generally, but Christianity specifically’, one interviewee describes the situation in Britain as 
one in which:  
 
Christians are discriminated against in the public square … you’ve got a hundred years 
of a secular experiment that’s gone all wobbly all over the place and people see religion 
as a threat to their power, to their influence and their world view (interview #3).  
 
Another representative, making the same point, claims that: ‘secularists want to drive religion 
out of the public sphere, to leave the field clear for them’, and are ‘creating a spiritual 
vacuum … that Islam is waiting to fill’ (interview #7). From a similar vantage point is the 
argument that the marginalisation of Christians has been driven by ‘an aggressive secularism 
that claims to be value neutral’, but in reality represents ‘an attempt to rid Western 
civilisation of Judeo-Christian values … it’s reminiscent, really, of the Soviet state, and it’s a 
complete denial of an individual or groups’ right to be able to express themselves freely’ 
(interview #8). Another interviewee asserts, just as vigorously, that ‘the whole equalities 
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agenda’ has led directly to ‘oppression and censorship’ to the extent that anyone disagreeing 
is ‘cut out of the public space’ (interview #5).  
These views are reflected in public statements from conservative Christian groups. Christian 
Concern maintains that: ‘We are witnessing an increasing restriction of religious freedom in 
this country. Increasing numbers of Christians have been penalised for their faith in the 
public sphere, often due to equalities legislation and the promotion of homosexual rights’ 
(http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/religious-freedom). The Christian Institute 
(2009: 5) warns of a ‘growing sense of intolerance’, claiming that Christians in Britain ‘feel 
that a hierarchy of rights has sprung up which leaves them bottom of the pile’. In a similar 
vein, CARE maintains that ‘in recent years we have seen the Christian voice being 
marginalised with many concerning restrictions on Christian freedom of speech’, and that 
‘Christian freedom . . . is not merely liberty to believe what we wish, but also liberty to live 
our lives according to our faith’ (http://www.care.org.uk/our-causes/more/religious-liberty). 
Tensions around free speech have also been highlighted by Core Issues Trust, who protested 
about ‘worrying issues about the closedown on debate around homosexuality in the UK’ 
following a ban on London Bus adverts carrying the line: ‘Not Gay! Ex-Gay, Post-Gay and 
Proud. Get over it!’ (http://www.core-issues.org/index.php?page=bus-case). The Evangelical 
Alliance, responding to the employment discrimination ruling in the European Court, 
maintains that ‘a hierarchy of rights now exists in UK law’, and calls for ‘more common 
sense for Christian belief in public life’, including ‘the reasonable accommodation of the 
expressions of religious belief in all its diverse forms’ (Evangelical Alliance, 2013).  
This emphasis on religious rights and freedoms has become increasingly prominent during 
the last decade. The shift in focus is illustrated by an analysis of press releases from the 
Christian Institute, one of the most well-known and publicly active conservative Christian 
groups in Britain, as well as being one of the few to make their archive publicly available. 
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From 1996 to 2000 the issue of religious liberty featured in just 9.8% of all press releases 
(from a total of 61), with the primary issues of concern centring on homosexuality (featuring 
in 44% of all items), education (21%) and marriage (16%). From 2001 to 2004 (figures for 
2005 were not available) religious liberty featured in 15% of all outputs (from a total of 63), 
with the key issues being education (40%), homosexuality (33%), and drugs (19%). From the 
mid-point of the decade, however, religious liberty was transformed into the single dominant 
topic of concern, featuring in 45% of press releases from 2006-2010 (from a total output of 
84), and 76% of press releases from 2011-2015 (September) (the total number in this case 
being 50). The next set of prominent issues during this latter period were the related topics 
(being connected through the theme of same-sex marriage) of homosexuality (with 64%) and 
marriage (with 50%).7 
Assertions about the marginalisation of Christianity often place the blame for this on the 
actions of the government as well as churches themselves. Alongside the introduction of 
equalities legislation under the administrations of New Labour, some of the most significant 
complaints in this regard are directed at the Coalition government for the legalisation of 
same-sex marriage and a failure to follow through on promises to allow a greater public role 
for faith-based organisations under the Big Society agenda. As one interviewee puts it, the 
government’s approach was ‘quite religiously illiterate in different ways, and even hostile’ 
(interview #3), while another maintains that: ‘the problem is what the government has wanted 
is the benefit that the Christian organisations bring in particular – which is loads of good 
social work on the ground – but you try and put Jesus in or prayer in, the thing that actually 
changes lives’, and the real attitude was ‘don’t give out the bibles, don’t talk about Jesus’ 
(interview #5). The restrictive impact of equality and diversity measures is also highlighted, 
with one interviewee claiming that this has meant that ‘the ability for the church to serve is 
then strangled’ (interview #2). Another makes the point more forcefully, accusing the 
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government of having ‘abused religious people’. As they complain, the government’s 
approach is ‘an attempt to, on the one hand, say that religions are important, and on the other 
hand to completely emasculate them in terms of any effectiveness in society’ (interview #8).  
Criticism of the government also comes from the Conservative Christian Fellowship. The 
legalisation of same-sex marriage – the symbolic high point of David Cameron’s attempt to 
detoxify the Conservative Party brand by moving it in a more socially liberal direction – was 
opposed by a number of Fellowship MPs, including: David Burrowes (one of the group’s 
founder members), John Glen (its Parliamentary Chairman), Stephen Crabb (then Secretary 
of State for Wales), Nicky Morgan (then Secretary of State for Education), Jeremy Lefroy, 
Fiona Bruce, David Amess and Julian Brazier. One interviewee, an ex- senior office holder in 
the Fellowship, maintained that the Prime Minister’s efforts to push forward on same-sex 
marriage had been ‘an astonishing decision’ based on the assumption that ‘evangelical 
Christians would just get over it and it wouldn’t be a big deal’. In their view, the actual result 
had been nothing short of ‘a political disaster’. As they explain:  
 
we’ve upset our traditional supporters by pressing ahead with it … we’ve sent a terrible 
signal, if you like, to gay people by the majority of Conservative MPs being against it, 
so you’ve got a lose lose. It was an absolutely ridiculous thing to do (interview #4).  
 
Alongside this, the role of the church in the marginalisation of religion is said to reside in its 
own wilful, and decades long abandonment of the public sphere. One representative claims 
that their organisation ‘would not need to exist if the church of England had spoken with a 
clear voice’, and laments that many of the problems associated with secularisation have 
emerged as a result of ‘the church failing to take her place, others vying loud in the public 
space’ (interview #5). Supporting this view, another interviewee notes that ‘a number of other 
organisations’ (notably Muslim and homosexual rights groups) have been ‘very active and 
very strong when it comes to lobbying … there is a tide that’s turning, and unless the church 
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stands up and speaks, we won’t be entitled to hold that position in the public sphere’ 
(interview #2). Highlighting the lack of engagement from Christians themselves, one 
respondent expresses a desire to see ‘Christ’s church militant here on earth’ and for 
Christians to become more politically organised, ‘getting out on to the streets and being 
active in the public sphere, getting elected, all these sorts of things’ (interview #7). 
 
The limits of frames 
A collective action frame based on the dangers of secularisation and the marginalisation of 
Christianity serves as a useful agent of cohesion for conservative Christian groups, fostering a 
sense of shared grievance and providing a motivational spur to action. At the same time, 
however, a central (and to some extent, paradoxical) feature of this narrative is its overtly 
secular character. While the beliefs and activities of conservative Christian groups are driven 
by theological concerns (e.g. Ysseldyk et al, 2010), and while ‘inward-facing’ activities 
directed at group members may well give prominence to these theological motivations 
(Klemp, 2010), the ‘outward-facing’ arguments that are deployed with a view to shaping 
wider sociocultural attitudes and issues of public policy are overwhelmingly framed in terms 
of secular norms and values. Arguments around the issue of abortion, for example, are often 
based on improving survival rates for premature births (typically drawing on data from 
EPICure), advances in medical technologies are frequently opposed on ‘slippery slope’ 
grounds involving the unpredictable social consequences (such as the rise of an 
instrumentalist view of humanity, the creation of designer babies and the risks of using 
human/animal hybrid embryos), the case against assisted dying is founded on the 
implications for the most vulnerable groups in society (a common argument here being that 
elderly and disabled citizens will feel under pressure to turn to assisted suicide rather than 
live on as a ‘burden’ on their families), while opposition to the legalisation of same-sex 
 19 
marriage was based primarily on arguments relating to historical tradition, the lack of an 
electoral mandate, and the alleged social problems (such as rising levels of crime and family 
breakdown) that would result (for more on these issues see e.g. Kettell, 2009, 2013; Hunt 
2014). 
The adoption of a collective action frame based on a language of minority rights and secular 
norms may appear to be somewhat unusual given that Christianity remains the single largest 
religion in Britain and continues to enjoy a wide range of privileges at the level of politics 
and law (including an established church, representatives in the legislature, an extensive (and 
growing) role within the education system, and numerous tax and legal exemptions). 
Research into the views of grassroots evangelical members is suggestive of a potential 
discrepancy too, with many lay evangelicals expressing a preference for identity markers 
based on notions of ‘distinctiveness’ rather than ‘marginalisation’ (Strhan, 2015, 2016). 
One explanation for the construction and deployment of a collective action frame 
emphasising minority rights and marginalisation is that it reflects a pragmatic response by 
organisational elites to a changing legal environment (particularly the growth of equalities 
legislation from the middle of the previous decade) and a recognition of the fact that, in an 
increasingly secularised society, religious groups can only hope to influence wider opinion by 
avoiding narrative claims that are couched in overt theological terms and by instead utilising 
discourses that are connected to secular, liberal norms (e.g. see Jelen, 2010; Graham, 2013). 
Indeed, the benefits of using a form of ‘strategic secularism’ to promote theological issues by 
drawing on the tactics (language, methods and tools) of secular culture (Engelke, 2009) are 
well recognised by representatives of conservative Christian groups. Explaining the reasoning 
behind the use of secular rather than religious arguments by their own organisation, for 
instance, one interviewee notes that:  
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It’s not because they don’t have these convictions … it’s because we live in a post-
Christian society, so if I use Christian arguments most people are not going to be 
persuaded by them … you’ve got to use the language that people connect with … if I’m 
talking to a Christian audience, then I’ll couch it in different ways (interview #1).  
 
On the same theme, another respondent states that the choice of ‘when to use explicit 
religious arguments and language in public life’ is ‘a big issue’ for their organisation, and 
maintains that while it is impossible to ‘separate the theology out from public discourse’, the 
danger of giving a green light to the use of theological arguments was that they ‘could end up 
with all sorts of stuff’ that could be politically disadvantageous. Thus, as they put it:  
 
There’s a time and a place for it … 99% of your Christian discourse is going to be 
implicit rather than explicit in that context, so you’ve got to be sensible about this, I 
think, because it plays into the hands of the secularists who just want to paint us as 
some sort of gung-ho (interview #3). 
 
A related assertion here is that the use of secular arguments does not contradict theologically 
based claims, but, rather, that the two forms are complementary modes of reasoning and that 
the findings of science, and social scientific research, are supportive of the underlying 
theological position. Thus, as one respondent observes, on the specific issue of same-sex 
marriage: 
 
It’s not that we’re dinosaurs or, you know, stick-in-the-muds, there is a truth about this 
that’s critically important, there’s nothing to do, you know, with preserving religious 
beliefs, it’s everything to do with the way the world is made … all the evidence is that 
children in a secure mother-father family do best (interview #6).  
 
The decision to use secular, as opposed to theological arguments, then, is:  
 
Because what we’re trying to do, what Christians in this are trying to do, is persuade … 
the majority, the people who are not swayed by religious arguments as such, that this 
particular view is right … the appeal is made on arguments that are common ground 
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arguments, common good arguments, and they should be. If God is the creator, then 
what is good for the creation will be in harmony with what God says (interview #6). 
 
Another interviewee sets out the same line of argument. As they put it: ‘the kind of 
apologetics that I would offer around the position we take is not couched in a religious 
argument … in my view there is enough in science that would support the view that we take’. 
The use of an overtly secular language, then, is not thought to be inauthentic or paradoxical 
because ‘most religious groups realise that they have a particular take on reality which is not 
shared across the board’, and because the findings of science and religion on issues such as 
the dangers of homosexuality and abortion are such that ‘in terms of the scientific data … 
there’s no need to appeal to the religious argument’ (interview #8). Making the point too, 
another representative argues that a successful defence of heterosexual marriage can be made 
on secular grounds because ‘science shows and studies show that children do best when 
raised by a mother and a father’, and because secular arguments are fully compatible with the 
religious view. As they put it: ‘I think a lot of secular interfacing arguments were made 
because they can be made’, and that ‘I believe them from a faith perspective, from believing 
in the bible, but science and sociology and life backs it up, it always does … that’s the truth’ 
(interview #5). 
 
Success or failure? 
The use of a collective action frame based around secular rather than theological arguments 
might provide conservative Christian groups with a useful means of appealing to a wider 
audience, but the evidence to date – as measured by policy progress on key campaign issues – 
suggests that the results have been somewhat mixed. On one hand, although the intractable 
problem of disentangling variables of cause and effect make it virtually impossible to 
ascertain the extent to which any practical influence on public policy issues can be attributed 
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to the particular actions of conservative Christian groups (Chong and Druckman, 2007), some 
areas of campaign success can be highlighted. Amongst these include: the rejection of the 
Adoption and Children Bill by the House of Lords in 2002 (opposed by conservative 
Christian groups for its proposal to allow homosexual couples to adopt); the introduction of 
internet filters designed to protect children from accessing pornographic material (the Online 
Safety Bill was defeated in 2012, but similar measures have recently been reintroduced with 
the addition of adult content blocks by some of Britain’s main internet service providers); and 
resistance to campaigns for the legalisation of assisted dying (with the latest attempt being 
defeated in the House of Commons in September 2015).  
Alongside this, one area in which conservative Christian groups can (somewhat less 
contentiously) be said to have achieved some measure of success concerns their ability to 
shape elements of public discourse around the theme of religious discrimination. A poll 
conducted for the BBC by ComRes in 2010, for instance, found that 44% of respondents felt 
that Britain was becoming less tolerant of religion.8 Propagating claims of marginalisation 
has been helped by the regular pursuit of high-profile court cases (such as those brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights) and by the cultivation of close links between 
certain conservative Christian groups and sections of the right-wing tabloid media. According 
to a study into religious claims made in the media between 2000 and 2010, the Christian 
Institute was found to be the fifth most prolific religious actor in Britain (making a total of 
140 claims in the media during this period), being surpassed only by the Muslim Council of 
Britain, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of Westminster and the Archbishop of 
York (Stuart and Ahmed, 2012).  
The relationship between conservative Christian groups and elements of the British media is 
similarly highlighted by an analysis of coverage involving these organisations. A comparative 
analysis of outputs from Britain’s four main right-wing tabloid newspapers (the Daily Mail, 
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the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Express and the Sun) shows that this relationship is not 
uniform, and that certain groups are given greater coverage than others. The Christian 
Institute is the most prominent conservative Christian group mentioned in both – featuring (as 
of August 2016) in 350 and 201 reports respectively in the Daily Mail and the Daily 
Telegraph. The nature and content of these reports are predominantly sympathetic, and focus 
overwhelmingly on the marginalisation of Christianity and freedom of religion issues. 
Examples from the Daily Mail include: ‘BBC accused of neglecting Christianity as it devotes 
air time to pagan festival’ (2 November, 2010), ‘Christian B&B owners sued for 
discrimination after refusing to allow gay couple to share a double bed’ (8 December, 2010), 
‘Christian's salary cut because he criticised gay marriage on Facebook’ (9 October, 2012), 
and ‘Meddling EU to probe Britain's Christian schools for discrimination ... because they 
favour Christian teachers!’ (21 February, 2015). The figures involved in this coverage are set 
out in Table 1.9 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
These trends are also highlighted by a comparative analysis of reporting on Britain’s main 
campaign groups for secularism, the British Humanist Association and the National Secular 
Society. While the reporting statistics here are far higher than for those of conservative 
Christian groups (the National Secular Society was reported on 978 times by the Daily Mail 
and 1,420 times by the Telegraph, for example), the coverage was almost universally 
negative, and favourable to a religious viewpoint. Examples from the Daily Mail included: 
‘Selfish culture is killing secular Europe, says Chief Rabbi’ (5 November, 2009), ‘Prayers 
really can heal the sick, finds study’ (5 August, 2010), ‘The secular attack on Bideford that 
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aims to destroy our national faith’ (2 December, 2011), and ‘David Cameron hails UK's 
'Christian values' in Christmas message’ (24 December, 2015).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Evidence also suggests that a collective action frame based on the marginalisation of 
Christians may resonate well with a wider Christian constituency. A 2009 opinion poll 
conducted by ComRes, for example, found that 58% of Christians in Britain believed that 
living according to their faith was now more difficult than five years previously. This figure 
rose to 66% when the time period was extended to two decades (Premier Christian Media, 
2011). A survey by the Evangelical Alliance (2012) found that 77% of evangelicals in Britain 
thought that it was becoming harder to live by the Christian faith, and a 2010 poll revealed 
that 93% of Christians believed (60% strongly) that religion, and Christianity in particular, 
was being marginalised (ComRes, 2010). Similar findings emerged from an inquiry into 
Christian experiences in Britain conducted by the cross-party group, Christians in Parliament. 
Almost three quarters of the organisations giving evidence to the inquiry (a total of 22 out of 
30 respondents) cited ‘religious freedom’ as a significant issue, some way ahead of the 
second and third placed issues of ‘family’ (being cited by 46% of respondents), and ‘life 
issues’ and ‘charity’ (with 30% each). A majority of respondents to the inquiry (56%) also 
said that Christians in Britain were being marginalised, and 50% maintained that they were 
being ‘discriminated against’ (figures calculated from Christians in Parliament, 2012).  
All the same, the potential success of conservative Christian groups is outweighed by their 
evident failures. One issue here has been a notable lack of campaign success in key areas 
such as securing a reduction in the time limit for abortion, preventing the legalisation of 
same-sex marriage and the repeated loss of legal challenges brought on issues of employment 
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discrimination. Another problem is that, while the size of the conservative (evangelical) 
population in Britain is far from insignificant, the lack of positive engagement with a frame 
of ‘marginalisation’ by many grass-roots evangelicals raises the possibility of future tensions 
and discontent with the collective action frame being deployed by group elites (see Strhan, 
2015, 2016). In a similar fashion, divisions and disagreements between conservative 
Christian groups also threatens to undermine any sense of wider cohesion, with active co-
operation between organisations being limited to specific high-profile campaigns.  
A potentially more significant problem, however, derives from the use of a secularised 
discourse itself. One issue here is that assertions of marginalisation, and related claims that 
supporters of conservative Christian views need to be accorded the same rights and equalities 
as other social interests, serve to highlight the sectional character of religious claims, 
undermining calls for special treatment and the justification of political and legal privileges. 
This is particularly so when these assertions are out-of-step with the majority of British 
public opinion (as is the case on critical issues such as abortion, assisted suicide and same-sex 
marriage) and where these privileges can themselves be seen as traducing the rights of other 
minority groups (e.g. see Clements, 2015).  
While research from the United States indicates that the use of collective action frames based 
on notions of rights may have a positive rather than a negative impact – an educative and 
liberalising effect that promotes ideals of universal rights and levels of tolerance towards out-
groups (e.g. Djupe et al, 2016; Lewis, 2016), others indicate that the polarising discourse of 
the Christian Right has had a detrimental effect on democratic civility and deliberation (e.g. 
see Klemp, 2010) and highlight the schismatic effects of promoting strong and reified 
religious identities (Bruce, 1994). Importantly, the extent to which findings based on the 
specific context of the U.S. (where levels of religiosity remain unusually high compared to 
other advanced Western nations, and where notions of individual rights have a particularly 
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high level of cultural symbolism) can be applied to Britain (where such notions are far less 
prevalent) remains an open question. 
Another potential problem with using collective action frames based on secular arguments is 
that this can reduce the amount of control that religious groups have over the direction of 
their own narrative claims and structures. In contrast to the use of theological arguments, 
about which religious groups can claim to have particular expertise, attempting to legitimise 
public policy arguments on secular terms (and particularly when these are legitimised on the 
basis of scientific evidence) can expose groups to unexpected shifts in the evidence base that 
can challenge and undermine the core assertions being made. If same-sex marriage does not 
lead to growing social problems, for example, or if the legalisation of assisted dying did not 
lead to a rising number of deaths amongst vulnerable groups in the way that conservative 
Christians contend, then the credibility of the arguments being deployed to oppose such 
policies would be severely (and perhaps fatally) compromised. At the same time, such a 
situation would heighten the risk of internal splits and fissures between group members 
committed to retaining a secular outward-facing logic – with the implication being that they 
would now need to support a position to which they were previously opposed (such as 
accepting same-sex marriage) – and those wishing to remain theologically ‘authentic’ (on 
these issues see Knutsen, 2011; Thomas and Olson, 2012; Thomas, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
Conservative Christian groups in Britain are organisationally diverse and politically engaged 
on a variety of issues, but are confronted by similar challenges brought about by the on-going 
process of secularisation. This poses a strategic dilemma between balancing the need for 
groups to position themselves within an increasingly secularised context, while at the same 
time maintain a sense of distinctiveness and internal cohesion. The common response to this 
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has been the construction of a collective action frame based on the ostensible social problems 
of secularisation and the threat posed to religious rights and freedoms. These assertions may 
be useful for providing group solidarity, but significant problems remain. The most serious of 
these pertain to the dynamics of a collective action frame based on secular norms and values, 
the long-term effects of which are unlikely to provide the kind of benefits that conservative 
Christian groups would like to see. Further research into the political behaviour of 













The Sun Total 
Christian Institute 350 201 61 23 635 
Christian Legal Centre 151 157 23 4 335 
Christian Medical Fellowship 137 77 5 3 222 
Christian Voice 103 86 22 5 216 
Christian Concern 91 99 23 2 215 
Evangelical Alliance 54 126 11 1 192 
Conservative Christian Fellowship 27 35 4 0 66 
Anglican Mainstream 6 47 4 1 58 
Core Issues Trust 7 13 4 1 25 
Total 926 841 157 40 1964 
 








The Sun Total 
British Humanist Association 207 301 31 9 548 
National Secular Society 978 1,420 88 18 2,504 
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1 The specific names of the groups involved are not listed because the relatively small 
number of participants might impinge upon the terms of anonymity. The interview recordings 
and transcripts, however, have been made available to the editors of this journal on request. 
2 Denominational labels are also open to contestation. Anglican Mainstream, for example, 
was described by a senior Church of England Bishop as being ‘anything but mainstream’ 
(interview, 22 June, 2013).  
3 The remainder included ‘Other’ (12%) and the Greens (6%). These figures excluded those 
who were undecided and the residents of Northern Ireland.  
4 The views expressed in this regard were frequently off the record and so cannot be 
reproduced here.  
5 One interviewee noted, for instance, that: developments in the United States were ‘really 
influential in terms of how it informs the Evangelical church in the UK’ (interview #3). 
6 Of the four claimants only Nadia Eweida was successful.  




9 These figures were obtained by using a Google advanced search, limiting the search terms 
(in this case, the names of the organisations involved) to the specific websites of the media 
outlets involved. The search was conducted on 18 August 2016. 
